Abstract-In this letter, we model the device-to-device (D2D) content sharing problem as a labor market where the base station (BS) acts as the principal and content providers serve as agents. A signaling-based content-sharing incentive (SCSI) mechanism is designed to encourage candidate content providers to participate in content sharing, and the optimal strategy for each content provider is derived to maximize their utility (monetary profit) while guaranteeing a non-negative utility for the BS. Simulation results show that the proposed SCSI mechanism can increase the content provider's utility and participating enthusiasm in D2D content sharing.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE GLOBAL mobile data traffic has been predicted to increase nearly eightfold between 2015 and 2020. The proliferation of intelligent mobile devices running multimedia applications such as content sharing, social networking and online gaming brings a huge challenge to future wireless networks. Evolving from end-to-end communications to content-centric wireless networking has become an inevitable trend. Traditional cellular communications urgently need new technologies and methods to tackle the challenge [1] , [2] .
Device-to-device (D2D) communications have been considered as a promising approach to improve spectrum and power efficiency [3] , [4] and offload traffic from cellular networks. For example, some UEs which have downloaded frequently requested content can store and share these content to other UEs via D2D links and avoid repeatedly downloading from the BS [5] . In this case, the BS's traffic load will be greatly reduced, and the cellular network capacity can be utilized more efficiently.
To promote D2D content sharing, the first problem is to motivate UEs to share with others using their own energy resource, e.g., the BS can offer a reward to compensate the content provider's cost to provide incentive [6] , [7] . Ideally the BS should select the UE with the best transmission capacity toward the content requester UE, and give reward according to Manuscript its capacity. However, the content provider UEs may compete for the reward by claiming higher capacity than its true value, which is a type of Information Asymmetry [8] . It is our goal to design an effective incentive mechanism and solve the information asymmetry for D2D content sharing. Contract theory is a powerful model to analyze incentive problem with information asymmetry from economics [9] , and has been adopted in some contemporary research work [10] , [11] . In the contract-theoretical model, the BS play as the principal, who outsources the data transmission work to some content provider UEs near the content requester UE. The content provider UEs serve as the agent, who compete for the content sharing work and get corresponding reward from the principal. Nazari and Jamalipour adopted the contract and auction theory to design a forwarding incentive mechanism for multi-relay cooperative wireless networks [10] . Zhang et al. [11] proposed a contract-based incentive mechanism for content dissemination in D2D cooperative communications. The incentive mechanisms in [10] , [11] employs the screening mechanism from contract theory to solve the Information Asymmetry problem -the transmission ability of the agents toward the content requester are naturally known to themselves, but not known to the principal. In screening model, the principal (i.e., the BS) offers a menu of contracts to the agents to separate different types of agents, and the agents' choices reveals their types (transmission abilities). In this process, the agents are passive, and if the BS can not estimate the agents' capacity accurately, the contract will not be fair to all the agents and may reduce the participating enthusiasm of some agents. we formulate the D2D content sharing problem based on the Principal-Agent model and use the signaling method to solve the associated Information Asymmetry problem while the previous work uses screening-based method to solve.
In this letter, we formulate the D2D content sharing incentive problem based on the Principal-Agent model, which is in the contract theory framework. The main contributions can be summarized as follows. First, we use the signaling method to solve the Information Asymmetry problem in the PrincipalAgent model while the previous work is screening-based method [11] . Compared to the screening based method, higher accuracy of the agent types or capabilities will be known by the principal. Second, we tackle the deceit problem in contract signing by designing the signal sent from a candidate content provider to the BS as a guarantee, which includes the guaranteed compensation information if the D2D content sharing fails. We calculate the optimal guarantee and maximize the utility of the content provider while a non-negative utility is ensured for the BS. Performance of the proposed SCSI mechanism is compared with two existing agent selection and 1558-2558 © 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information. incentive schemes. Simulation results show that the proposed SCSI mechanism can much more effectively motivate the UE participation in D2D content sharing. The rest of the letter is organized as follows. Section II presents the system model. In Section III, the SCSI mechanism is proposed. Simulation results are presented and analyzed in Section IV. Section V concludes this work.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a single-cell cellular network where there are one BS in the center, a number of cellular UEs, one content requester (C R) UE far from the BS, and N potential content provider (C P) UEs (i.e., C P 1 , C P 2 , . . . , C P N ) randomly distributed around the C R within the maximum D2D communication range d max , as shown in Fig. 1 . Assume that all the D2D transmitters use the same transmission power P D and the UE position is semi-static within the D2D session, since several mega-bytes can be transmitted within 1 second in LTE. The channel model consists of path-loss and Rayleigh fading. The received power P r at the C R from the C P n can be expressed as P D d n −α h n , where h n stands for the Rayleigh fading power gain and follows a unit-mean exponential distribution, d n is the distance between the C R and the C P n , and α is the path loss exponent.
We consider the D2D overlay model, i.e., D2D communications are assigned with dedicated radio resources and there is no interference between D2D and conventional cellular links. Then the received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of C R from C P n can be expressed as:
where n 0 is the power spectral density of the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN), and B is the channel bandwidth, which is assumed to be the same for all D2D links. It is easy to show that γ n follows an exponential distribution with
Given γ th as the SNR threshold , the outage probability of the n th D2D link (i.e., the link between the C R and the C P n ) can be calculated as:
The data rate of the n th D2D link is given as:
When the C R UE requests contents (e.g., video clips, news or music) from the BS, the BS can either provide the requested content directly through the cellular downlink, or select a C P UE to deliver the content via a D2D link. Since the candidate C P UEs have no obligation to help the C R UE, the BS should provide the selected C P UE with some reward, e.g., in money, once the D2D content sharing is successfully completed. In this case, the BS acts as a principle and the selected C P UE serves as an agent as in the contract theory [9] . Due to the space limit, we assume that there are two types of C P UE: high type (θ H ) and low type (θ L ) while the case more than two types will be considered in our future work.
The type θ n of C P n is proportional to the channel gain g n between C P n and the C R UE, i.e.,
A threshold g 0 , which is designed by the BS, is used to decide a C P's type (C P's type is known among the C Ps), i.e., θ n = θ H if g n ≤ g 0 , otherwise θ n = θ L . A θ Htype C P UE is likely to offer a higher data rate on the D2D link to the C R UE than a θ L -type C P using the same transmit power. Similar to the Information Asymmetry problem in microeconomics [8] , the BS may not know the exact type of each C P. We assume that the BS knows that the portions of high-type C P UEs and low-type C P UEs are ρ and 1 − ρ (0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1), respectively. Assuming that the C P n is selected, we define the utility function of the BS as follows:
where R n is the data rate of the D2D content sharing link as given in (3), and W n is the monetary reward given to the selected C P UE,
, and μ B is the per-packet gain of the BS measured in monetary units [9] . For simplicity, we assume μ B = 1 and the reservation utility level is no less than zero [9] . The utility of the C P n is defined as:
where c is the monetary cost for the C P UE to transmit a packet to the C R UE with transmit power P D .
III. SIGNALING-BASED CONTENT-SHARING INCENTIVE MECHANISM FOR D2D CONTENT SHARING

A. Signaling
The signaling was first proposed to analyze the job market [12] , in which the education level is considered as a trustworthy signal sent by the potential employee since it takes intelligence and years of efforts to acquire. In economics [8] , signaling is used to solve the problem of Asymmetric Information, where the principal cannot directly observe the abilities of the agents. The principal will offer a higher reward to an agent who sends a signal than to one who does not. Sending a signal should be costly to an agent, otherwise low-type agents may send signals to pretend to be high-type agents in order to obtain a higher reward than they actually deserve. The risk of hiring a low-type agent can thus be reduced.
A successful signaling game will lead to a perfect Bayesian equilibrium [9] , which includes the Separating and Pooling Equilibria. In the former, different types of agents send different signals. In the latter, the same signal is sent by all agents.
In our proposed SCSI mechanism, if no signal is received from C P UEs, i.e., in the pooling status, the BS would pay the expected reward, ρW H + (1 − ρ)W L , to the selected C P [8] . Since the expected reward is lower than W H and higher than W L , a high-type C P UE would like to reveal its type to the BS more than a low-type one given the cost of sending a signal.
B. Signal Design
We design the signal sent by a C P UE to the BS as a guarantee, which promises a certain amount of monetary compensation for the BS if the D2D content sharing fails. LetŌ H andŌ L denote the average communication failure probability of θ H -type C P and θ L -type C P UE, respectively, which can be calculated by (2); x and y denote the guarantee (i.e., the amount of money) promised by θ H -type and θ L -type C P UE in the guarantee signal, respectively. Since sending the signal (guarantee) requires additional cost, the utility function of the C P n is modified to:
where
is the guaranteed amount of compensation if C P n is a high-type (low-type) C P UE. In order to form the Separating Equilibrium, according to [9] and [8] , two constraints must be satisfied: Incentive Compatible(IC) and Individual Rationality(IR).
Definition 2: IC: C Ps must prefer the guarantee designed specifically for their own types and , i.e.,
whereŌ H y (Ō L x) is the guaranteed compensation of a hightype (low-type) C P UE if it pretends to be a low-type (hightype) C P.
Definition 3: IR:
The utility of a high-type C P UE after sending signal is no less than the former, i.e.,
(10) Note that low-type C P UEs will not send signals [8] , and thus y = 0. Based on (8), (9) and (10), the value of x is bounded by:
C. Optimal Solution
We maximize the utility function of the selected high-type C P UE, and the optimization problem can be written as :
This is a linear problem. The optimal x * is found as:
Thus, the maximum utility of the high-type C P is:
In practice, x might be higher than x * and the selected C P's utility may be lower thanÛ C P , since the C P UEs may increase the guarantee to win the competition. For example, among the high-type C P UEs, the ones with higher residual battery levels may send stronger signals than those with lower residual battery levels to increase the probability of being selected as the content provider. The detailed competition analysis is beyond the scope of this letter.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
We evaluate the performance of the proposed SCSI mechanism in comparison with two existing agent selection approaches. The first one is Random Selection (RS), in which the BS randomly selects a C P from the responding C P UEs. The second one is No Information Asymmetry (NIA) [9] , in which the BS knows the exact type information of all the C P UEs without any Information Asymmetry. In the simulations, the high reward W H is set as 0.4 while the low reward W L has two different values: W L1 = 0.1 and W L2 = 0.2.
A. Utility of C P UE
The utility of C P UE versus ρ is shown in Fig. 2 . In NIA, the C P utility is always zero since the C P's type is known by the BS and there is no need of a signaling game. No matter W L is W L1 or W L2 , the C P utilities of both SCSI and RS increase with ρ (the percentage of θ H -type C P UEs), but the utility of the former is larger than the latter. The two utilities become the same when ρ approaches 0 or 1. In RS, the BS does not know the types of C P UEs, and thus only wants to pay the expected reward to the selected C P UE if the D2D Fig. 2 . Utility of C P vs. ρ. content sharing succeeds. We can see that W L1 leads to a lower C P utility than W L2 because it offers a lower expected reward. When ρ is zero, there is no high type C P, both the expected reward in RS and the reward in SCSI are W L , so the two utilities will be the same. In SCSI, when ρ approaches 1, there are more high-type C P UEs and the expected reward becomes very close to W H . This leads to a reduced a desire of high-type C P UE to compete the high reward through sending signal. Therefore, when ρ approaches 1, signaling stops and the C P utilities of SCSI and RS will become the same again. Although the C P utility of SCSI is lower for W L1 than for W L2 , the utility gain of SCSI over RS is higher for W L1 as compared with that for W L2 .
B. Guarantee
The upper and lower bounds of x calculated in (11) are plotted versus ρ in Fig. 3 . We can see that W L1 results in larger values of upper and lower bounds of x as compared with W L2 . Since the lower W L causes a lower expected reward in the pooling status, and θ H -type C P UEs are more eager to be selected by increasing the guarantee value. The minimum value of x (x min ) maintains constant while the maximum value (x max ) decreases with ρ for both W L1 and W L2 . This is because x min is the lowest cost for a high-type C P UE to distinguish itself from the low-type C P UEs and could not be reduced any further. When ρ increases, there are more hightype C P UEs, the expected reward increases, and the desire of individual θ H -type CP UEs to be distinguished from θ Htype ones reduces, so x max decreases. When x max is equal to x min , the θ H -type C P UEs will stop sending signals and the guarantee goes down to 0.
V. CONCLUSION
In this letter, we adopt the signaling from microeconomics to design an incentive mechanism for D2D content-sharing in cellular networks. We propose a SCSI mechanism to motivate UEs to participate in D2D content sharing, and calculate the optimal signal (guarantee) for each C P UE to achieve Separating Equilibrium. Simulation results show that the SCSI mechanism can increase the the C P UE's utility and that the guarantee shall be adjusted according to the percentage of high type content providers and BS offered reward values. The signaling overhead and time delay of the SCSI will be studied in our future work.
